Introduction
The current working definition of apathy is a decrease in goal-directed behaviours characterized by reduced interest and emotions that cannot be attributed to diminished levels of consciousness, cognitive impairment or emotional distress (Starkstein and Leentjens, 2008) . It thereby constitutes a prominent and disabling symptom by itself or as a component of 'negative signs' in strategically-placed focal lesions of the basal ganglia, neurodegenerative diseases such as Parkinson's disease, certain forms of fronto-temporal dementia, Alzheimer's and Huntington's disease and in both schizophrenia and major depression (Bhatia and Marsden, 1994; Levy and Dubois, 2006; Starkstein and Leentjens, 2008) . It is widely acknowledged nowadays that apathy is a frequent non-motor symptom in Parkinson's disease, and affects up to 40% of de novo patients, resulting in a considerable burden for both patients and caregivers (Pagonabarraga et al., 2015) . To the best of our knowledge, no study has examined either how apathy emerged as an independent symptom in Parkinson's disease in the late 19th century, or the conceptual changes which mark its evolution from its early beginnings to its current importance. Such historical assessment might also reveal a parallel delineation of terms relating to both apathy and frontal subcortical circuit disorders.
We therefore reviewed articles and textbooks in English, French and German on psychic signs including apathy, anxiety and depression, to determine the historical crossroads in the delineation of apathy in Parkinson's disease and basal ganglia disorders. Our study ranged from the first description of the disease in 1817 by James Parkinson (1755 Parkinson ( -1824 in London to the present day. We also carried out an extensive PubMed search using the terms 'Parkinson's disease', 'psychic signs', 'non-motor signs', 'anxiety', 'depression', 'hallucination', 'apathy', 'abulia', 'anhedonia', 'psychic akinesia', 'athymormia' and 'bradyphrenia'. We here briefly recall the philosophical roots of apathy and then present the landmarks which paved the way to the current delineation of apathy in Parkinson's disease (Fig. 1 ).
Apathy and the will from Ancient Greece to the 18th century Neostoic philosophers Long before it featured in medical nosography, the term 'apathy' existed as a philosophical concept whose meaning changed significantly between Ancient Greek times and the 18th century.
Apathy is an old term, derived from the Greek apatheia (a-pathos, i.e. without passion), which is referenced in old manuscripts as in Furetière's French dictionary published in 1701. For the Stoics of Ancient Greece, the term had positive connotations, and they 'were proud to experience absolute apathy and to be insensitive to sadness'. They wanted their souls to be in a state of calm and quietness. Greek philosophers also analysed the origins and motivations of human actions. Aristotle claimed that we are moved to action only when we grasp the object of desire ('orexis') (37, 39; De Anima 3.10, .
Several centuries later in Roman times, both Galen and the first Christians were inspired by Stoic philosophers. In the 18th century, Neostoic philosophers such as John Locke (1632-1704) with his conception of the will, and Thomas Reid (1710-96) and his theories of perception and volition revived the benefits of a virtuous life with adequate control of the passions (Berrios, 1996) . Locke defined the will as a human directive faculty with the power to direct the body or mind. A 'power' to begin or 'abstain', continue or end the 'actions of our minds', and 'motions of our bodies', 'barely by a thought or preference of the mind ordering'. In David Hume's philosophy (1711-76), the concept of will or volition relates mainly to the final cause or goal of the action (Berrios, 1996) . The goal to be achieved, rather than the motivation behind an action, therefore, better explains the will.
In the course of the 19th century, the term apathy was increasingly used in medical nosography with a different meaning. The 1873 edition of the French Littré and Robin medical dictionary, for example, defined apathy as indifference, insensitivity or inability to feel emotions or to react when faced with pleasant-and more importantlysad events. The incorporation of apathy into Parkinson's disease nosology, as outlined below, is an illustration of the advances made in the delineation of neuropsychiatric syndromes during the late 19th century.
Early descriptions of psychic signs in Parkinson's disease and Brissaud's delineation of apathy as an independent symptom A long time passed between the first description of Parkinson's disease in 1817 and a complete report of all its psychic signs. In his Essay on the Shaking Palsy, James Parkinson first mentioned psychic symptoms such as delirium and sleep disorders. During the decades 1860-80 in Paris, Jean-Martin Charcot (1825-93) emphasized the absence of mental disability except in the final stages of the disease. True recognition of neuropsychiatric symptoms directly related to Parkinson's disease was achieved in 1882 with Benjamin Ball's report (1833-93) on seven patients in Paris (Lees, 1990) . Depression and hallucinations were the most frequent psychic manifestations. In Ball's opinion, Parkinson's disease was directly responsible for these symptoms, and he took the parallel evolution of motor and psychic symptoms as evidence for this view. In his 1888 textbook on neurology, William Gowers (1845 Gowers ( -1915 in London considered that 'mental depression' and 'delusions' were frequently associated with Parkinson's disease.
The term apathy appeared in Paris as an individualized and specific disabling medical condition in Parkinson's disease after Charcot's death. Edouard Brissaud (1852 Brissaud ( -1909 (Fig. 2) , one of Charcot's pupils, took over the Tuesday lessons at the Salpêtrière from 1893 to 1895. Brissaud devoted two successive lessons to Parkinson's disease, the 22nd and 23rd, in which he specifically reported psychic signs including apathy (Brissaud, 1895) . For the first time, apathy was recognized as a pathological condition and an independent sign alongside other psychiatric features (Fig. 3) . Brissaud explicitly defined 'absolute apathy' as a state of 'mixed indifference and lack of reaction to external as well as internal events', thereby mirroring the lack of spontaneous movement and stiffness in motion. In Brissaud's words, parkinsonian patients 'speak no more than they move', 'seem unbound from the world', 'withdrawn into themselves' and are 'indifferent to everything'. Apathy was also clearly separated from depression, anxiety, and cognitive impairment. In Brissaud's opinion, Parkinson's disease patients' apathy could be attributed to a process of 'intellectual welding' (soudure intellectuelle in French), which mirrored their motor disability. Apathetic patients remained inert in the absence of external impulse, as if they 'needed to be provoked' in order to react, by analogy with physical equilibrium. This similarity in both the motor and psychic manifestations of Parkinson's disease described by Brissaud, was also reflected by amimia, which mirrored apathetic parkinsonian patients' internal state of mind. These remarkable and comprehensive insights subsequently proved to be seminal, albeit with some delay.
During the following years and until World War I, several medical theses recognized apathy as a psychic sign of Parkinson's disease. However, Brissaud's specific description of apathy in patients with Parkinson's disease was not recognized internationally, as can be seen from textbooks by leading German authors such as Heinrich Erb (1840 -1921 ), Hermann Oppenheim (1857 -1919 and Emil Kraepelin (1856 Kraepelin ( -1926 ).
Naville's concept of bradyphrenia in post-encephalitic parkinsonian patients (1922) The beginning of the 20th century was a period of apparently chaotic but instrumental reorganisation of the terminology of both motor and psychic disorders in Parkinson's disease with the delineation of akinesia and bradyphrenia.
A pivotal contribution followed with Karl Wernicke's classification (1848-1904) of behavioural syndromes in mental illnesses in 1900 in Berlin (de Ajuriaguerra, 1971) . He coined the term akinesia to describe 'akinetic', catatonia-like behaviours, as opposed to hyperkinetic behavioural manifestations like mania. Wernicke thereby established a clear-cut dichotomy between akinetic and hyperkinetic syndromes, hypothesising that motor signs actually represent the visible tip of the iceberg of internal psychic movements, also referred to as 'psychosis of motility'. The meaning of akinesia then mutated under the influence of Wernicke's pupil Karl Kleist (1870 Kleist ( -1960 (de Ajuriaguerra, 1971) . He defined akinesia as a syndrome involving loss of initiative and self-drive in behavioural frontal lobe syndromes, notably in patients suffering from brain trauma. This proved a posteriori to be similar to Brissaud's view on apathy. In 1923, a radical conceptual breakthrough was achieved in Berlin by Friedrich Heinrich Lewy (1885 Lewy ( -1950 , who used the term akinesia to specifically designate the delay in movement initiation in parkinsonism in his influential textbook (de Ajuriaguerra, 1971 ). Lewy's definition of akinesia remains unchallenged.
Although 'apathy' appeared to give way to other terms, its meaning was preserved by François Naville (1883 Naville ( -1968 (Fig. 4) in Geneva. In 1922 he coined a new term, bradyphrenia (Naville, 1922) . Specifically addressing the question of the 'mental complications of encephalitis lethargica', he described the syndrome of apathy with remarkable clinical insight separating motor, cognitive and emotional aspects. He described 'a very frequent and particular state of fatigue and mental fading [. . .] characterized by diminished voluntary attention, spontaneous interest, initiative, effort and work capacity, accompanied by objective fatigue and slight decrease in memory' (Naville, 1922 ). Naville's original contribution was to definitively distinguish cognitive and motivational aspects in the apathetic behaviour of parkinsonian patients with encephalitis lethargica. Aided by the clever psychometric experiments of Claparède, founder of the Geneva school of psychology, he performed a large battery of cognitive tests in the setting of an experimental psychological laboratory. Naville was able to isolate a set of clinical symptoms that he coined 'bradyphrenia', describing slowness of thought as a feature separate from slowness of movement and contributing to overall slowness of action. He deciphered a specific disturbance in initiation and novelty seeking, showing that difficulties in problem solving in parkinsonian patients with bradyphrenia are most prominent in tests largely independent from external stimulation and can be much improved following encouragement and repeated external stimulation. According to Naville, 'it is not only the peripheral execution of movement which is slow, it is not only that time is lost between the given order and the beginning of execution, but it is first and foremost the distribution of orders in movements which is slow and sometimes suspended, [which may disappear] if an external stimulus [is applied]'. He eventually drew a parallel between 'disorders of motor tone' and loss of 'psychic tone' in post-encephalitic patients. This suggests that Naville intuited shared pathophysiological dysfunction of motor and non-motor symptoms in basal ganglia disorders. His findings were rapidly and positively acknowledged. In the light of the similarities found in the motor features of encephalitis lethargica and patients with Parkinson's disease, seminal studies were later conducted on bradyphrenia in Parkinson's disease and its relation to depression. Between 1920 and 1980, no conceptual alterations in the meaning of bradyphrenia occurred. Rogers et al. in London examined the cognitive, affective, and motor components of bradyphrenia in Parkinson's disease and psychomotor retardation in depression by comparing 'de novo' Parkinson's disease patients with patients with primary depressive illness and normal individuals (Rogers et al., 1987) . They observed a direct relationship between bradyphrenia and affective disturbances in both Parkinson's disease and depression and showed cognitive impairment to have a minor role in bradyphrenia. These results are consistent with Naville's hypothesis that in Parkinson's disease, mental slowness is caused not only by slow execution of movements, but also by loss of initiative and self-drive.
Emergence of neuropsychiatric syndromes associated with basal ganglia disorders in the 1970-90s
A number of terms that were either used from the 1970-90s (athymormia, autoactivation deficit, and pure psychic akinesia), or that have been revisited more recently (abulia, anhedonia), have aimed to describe the abnormal behaviour associated with frontal-subcortical circuit impairment. All are worthy of comment, as they have certain features in common with apathy (for a review see Pagonabarraga et al., 2015) . 
Abulia
From the 1830s, alienists used the term abulia when referring to certain mental disorders in their patients. Interest increased in the 1890s with the work of several psychologists from Paris, Pierre Janet (1859-1947), Alfred Binet (1857-1911) and Theodule Armand Ribot (1839-1916) (Berrios, 1996) . These authors defined abulia as the 'loss, lack or impairment of the power of the will to execute what is in the mind. In this condition there is no paralysis or disorder of the muscular system, and frequently there is no lack of desire or of realisation of the end sought; but the transition from motive and desire to execution becomes abnormally difficult or impossible'. Ribot evoked a weakness in the commands sent to the motor centres. Noteworthy in the late 19th century in London, John Hughlings Jackson suggested that the will was 'located in the cortex and the highest motor centres sited in the striatum' (Berrios, 1996) . Subsequent pathological studies correlated abulia with restricted lesions in the basal ganglia and frontal lobes, and the term became more widely accepted as a 'severe condition characterized by reduced spontaneous verbal, motor, cognitive, and emotional behaviours' (Bhatia and Marsden, 1994) .
Anhedonia
Anhedonia, first introduced by Ribot in 1897, is defined as the inability to experience pleasure (Berrios, 1996) . It is classically associated with mental disorders such as depression and schizophrenia. However, several studies have linked this symptom to various neurodegenerative diseases including Parkinson's disease. Anhedonia in Parkinson's disease appears to be a common phenomenon linked to depression, apathy severity, and frontal lobe dysregulation and could respond to antiparkinsonian treatment. It is also described in non-depressed Parkinson's disease patients with isolated apathy, even in untreated de novo patients. Anhedonia is characterized by deficits in anticipatory pleasure and behavioural drive, rather than consummatory pleasure or reward responsiveness, particularly in Parkinson's disease patients with isolated apathy (Jordan et al., 2013) .
Athymormia, pure psychic akinesia and autoactivation deficit
From the 1970s to the 1990s, reports appeared of behavioural changes in patients with basal ganglia disorders. These included a 'lack of voluntary behaviour', a marked reduction in spontaneous activity also called 'athymormia' (a term first used about schizophrenic patients by the psychiatrists Dide and Guiraud in 1922), 'pure psychic akinesia', or 'loss of psychic self-activation'. These syndromes were associated with focal lesions of the caudate nucleus, globus pallidus, anterior limb and genu of the internal capsule, anterior cingulate cortex, bilateral paramedian thalamus, and both medial and lateral aspects of the prefrontal lobes (Laplane et al., 1984; Habib and Poncet, 1988) . Laplane et al. in Paris reported 'dramatic psychic akinesia' (without permanent dementia) in three patients who had incompletely recovered from toxic encephalopathy. This 'was reversible when the patient was stimulated, as if there was a loss of self-psychic activation' i.e. failure to spontaneously elicit mental activity (Laplane et al., 1984) . CT scans of the three patients showed bilateral lesions in the basal ganglia, mainly within the globus pallidus. These patients could lie for hours 'doing nothing', 'in the absence of external stimulation'. One patient described his state as 'a blank in my mind'. The authors emphasized that patients were neither demented nor depressive. Interestingly, the reversibility of psychic akinesia by external stimulation seen in these patients is very similar to the clinical description of decreased 'psychic tone' observed by Naville in patients with 'pure mental sequelae' of encephalitis lethargica (Naville, 1922) .
When describing the behavioural and motor consequences of focal lesions of the basal ganglia in humans, Bhatia and Marsden in London found abulia or 'psychic akinesia' (defined as 'loss of drive' or 'apathy with loss of initiative and of spontaneous thought and emotional responses') to be 'the commonest behavioural disturbance' (Bhatia and Marsden, 1994) . Abulia/apathy was linked to 'small and large lesions in the caudate nucleus sparing the lentiform nucleus', and to restricted lesions in the globus pallidus, 'all bilateral but never with putaminal lesions'.
Subsequently, in 2001, Laplane and Dubois proposed the term of 'auto-activation deficit' to characterize the inability to spontaneously induce mental activity that is reversible with external stimulation. The authors stressed that environmental stimulation could temporarily reverse the impairment of spontaneous internal activation, and that the development of the syndrome was intimately related to basal ganglia pathology and could be differentiated from the 'abulia observed in patients with frontal lesions' because in those patients behavioural, cognitive, and emotional abilities did not 'become normal under external stimulation'.
Apathy in the L-DOPA era and its behavioural implications
The advent of L-DOPA at the turn of the 1960-70s was revolutionary and changed the quality of life and life expectancy of patients with Parkinson's disease. In an early report (de Ajuriaguerra, 1971) , de Ajuriaguerra in Geneva discussed the relationship between akinesia, rigidity and catatonia, because L-DOPA appeared more effective on akinesia than on rigidity, and had a beneficial effect on automatic activities. This paper reviewed Lewy's definition of akinesia. As outlined by others, de Ajuriaguerra stated that the terms bradyphrenia and psychic akinesia have been used interchangeably (Rogers et al., 1987) .
The discovery of L-DOPA undoubtedly changed our views about the influence of dopaminergic systems on cognition, emotion and motivation. In the early 1970s in New York, Oliver Sacks (1933 Sacks ( -2015 was one of the first to describe behavioural side effects of L-DOPA and to systematically confront disease related motor, cognitive and emotional symptoms and their L-DOPA-induced counterpart in post-encephalitic parkinsonian patients. According to Sacks, apathy with emotional flatness in parkinsonism turns into its opposite, coined 'hyperpathy', with L-DOPA replacement therapy, characterizing features such as increase in appetite, sexual arousal, irritability, aggressiveness, or impatience. His astute observations are summarized in his notes on a blackboard (Fig. 5) . Today, Parkinson's disease-related apathy appears as a mental disorder resulting from the 'hypodopaminergic' state, at the opposite of L-DOPA-induced psychiatric side-effects such as hypomania ('overenthusiasm' in the words of Oliver Sacks) and impulse control disorders, suggesting the existence of a continuous spectrum of behavioural disorders, linked to insufficient or excessive levels of dopamine in frontal-subcortical circuits (Pagonabarraga et al., 2015) . Based on neurochemical post-mortem studies, a hypothesis on the relationship between the psychiatric symptoms of Parkinson's disease and damage to the mesocorticolimbic dopaminergic pathway was subsequently made in 1984 by Agid and co-workers. Dysfunction of the ventral tegmental area and its mesocorticolimbic dopaminergic projections could explain depression and apathy as disease-related symptoms and psychosis, as an L-DOPAinduced side-effect.
The advent of subthalamic nucleus deep brain stimulation (STN-DBS) in the 1990s marked a second therapeutic breakthrough in Parkinson's disease. One unexpected side-effect was the occurrence of postoperative apathy, which could be explained as a non-motor withdrawal syndrome (featuring particularly apathy, but also anxiety and depression), related to post-surgical reduction in dopaminergic treatment (Thobois et al., 2010) . This postoperative apathy could be related to mesolimbic dopaminergic denervation and was shown to respond to treatment with dopamine agonists (Thobois et al., 2010; Pagonabarraga et al., 2015) . (Marin, 1991) . Marin suggested that apathy should be designated as a distinct psychiatric syndrome, characterized by deficits in goal-directed behaviours, as seen from a 'simultaneous diminution in the cognitive and emotional concomitants of goal directed behaviour' (Marin, 1991) . His conceptualization clearly identified apathy as a prominent and independent symptom in patients with primary depression and neurodegenerative diseases. Apathy as a clinical term was now used to refer to a pathological behaviour characterized by diminished drive and motivation, lack of purposeful behaviour, decreased interest in habitual pastimes, with decreased emotional responsiveness and expression. This construct encompassed previous terms like abulia and athymormia, and considered abulia to be a severe form of apathy. As Marin clearly stated: 'in clinical practice, the diagnosis of abulia is reserved for patients who are awake but otherwise severely impaired in their ability to communicate and to initiate and self-regulate purposeful behaviours'. 'Therefore, from a conceptual standpoint, abulia and apathy are on a continuum of motivational and emotional deficits, abulia representing the more severe portion of the continuum' (Marin, 1990) .
Revisiting
After Marin, the construct of apathy as a neuropsychiatric syndrome was organized into a standardized set of diagnostic criteria by Starkstein and Leentjens (2008) . According to Starkstein's modified diagnostic clinical criteria, based on those of Marin, diminished goal-directed behaviour is defined as a 'lack of effort or energy to perform everyday activities' and 'dependency on prompts from others to structure everyday activities'; diminished goal-directed cognition by 'lack of interest in learning new things, or in new experiences' and 'lack of concern about one's personal problems'; and reduced emotional concomitants of goal-directed behaviours by 'unchanging or flat affect' and 'lack of emotional responsivity to positive or negative events'.
In addition, Levy and Dubois underlined the importance of defining the syndrome of apathy as a 'quantitative reduction of voluntary, goal-directed behaviours' (Levy and Dubois, 2006) that may result from disruption of several frontal subcortical circuits: (i) 'orbital-medial prefrontal cortex or related subcortical regions within the basal ganglia (e.g. ventral striatum and ventral pallidum)', that precludes the patient from 'associating emotions with behaviour' and manifests as emotional blunting or decreased reactivity to daily-life activities and stimuli; (ii) 'dorsolateral prefrontal cortex or related subcortical regions within the basal ganglia (e.g. dorsal caudate nucleus) that impairs the 'elaboration of plans of actions' and precludes the setting of 'goals for the future'; or (iii) bilateral 'associative and limbic territories of the internal portion of the globus pallidus' leading to an 'inability to self-activate thoughts or self-initiate actions' that contrasts with 'a relatively spared ability to generate externally driven behaviour'. This third type of apathy was considered by the authors to be the most severe form of apathy and consistent with the syndrome of 'auto-activation deficit', also known as 'psychic akinesia' or 'athymormia' (Levy and Dubois, 2006) . However, this view is not fully established and further work is thus warranted.
Recent research highlights the delineation of the concept of apathy in Parkinson's disease, which can be considered as a neuropsychiatric syndrome resulting from the structural and functional disruption of different brain systems and networks that alter the maintenance of spontaneous mental activity and the capacity of affected individuals to associate emotions with complex stimuli (Pagonabarraga et al., 2015) . In accordance with Brissaud's seminal description more than 120 years ago, apathy can manifest in Parkinson's disease as a pure psychic syndrome independent from depression, anxiety or other mental disorders. This concept has yet some limitations due to the frequent overlap in Parkinson's disease of apathy, depression and anxiety as already stressed above, and to the debated issue of the hierarchical contribution of depression and cognitive deficits to the occurrence of apathy.
Nevertheless, the clinical differentiation of apathy caused by blunted affect or decreased reactivity to emotional stimuli, from the emotional symptoms of depression, and from difficulties in planning or organizing mental programs as a consequence of executive dysfunction or more widespread cognitive impairment, is an important goal. This would help to classify patients correctly in clinical trials, and could guide the rationale for individualized treatment approaches to apathetic symptoms (e.g. dopamine agonists, methylphenidate, cholinesterase inhibitors, antidepressants, etc.) (Pagonabarraga et al., 2015) .
Conclusion
After Brissaud's initial recognition of apathy as a behavioural syndrome in Parkinson's disease, apathy progressively emerged as an independent symptom at the crossroads between neurology and psychiatry. Today apathy is seen as a disorder of motivated behaviour. Its multidimensional nature indicates how cognitive, emotional and motor features are deeply intertwined in basal ganglia disorders, including Parkinson's disease, and stresses how the accurate distinction and subsequent definition of specific symptoms proves instrumental for the study of basal ganglia disorders.
